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COMPARATIVE INVESTOR EDUCATION*
James A. Fanto'
INTRODUCTION
Investor education is of worldwide concern simply because
of demographics. In the developed world, the ratio of retirees
to active workers is expected to increase beginning in approx-
imately 2010, particularly on account of the impending retire-
ment of the "baby boom" generation.' A continued decline in
fertility and increase in longevity further exacerbate this ra-
tio.2  Retirement systems are primarily "pay-as-you-go"
("PAYG"), which means that governments tax the earnings of
current workers to support retirees.3 If the ratio of retirees to
workers is too great, a PAYG system becomes unsustainable
because it places a heavy burden on employees through payroll
taxes and damages the competitiveness of a country's business-
es, which must bear a part of the high labor costs partially at-
tributable to generous pension benefits.4 In some countries,
therefore, a shift has occurred, or is occurring, from PAYG to
"funded" pensions whereby employers and employees set aside
retirement funds for the employees during the latters' working
© 1998 James A. Fanto. All Rights Reserved.
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1 See generally GROUP OF TEN, THE MACROECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL IMPLICA-
TIONS OF AGEING POPULATIONS 5-7 (1998).
2 See id.
See AXEL BORscH-SPAN, RETIREMENT INCOME: LEVEL, RISK, AND SUBSTITU-
TION AMONG INCOME COMPONENTS 6 (OECD DEELSA/ILO (97) 3, 1997).
' See id. at 4 ("Due to international competition, however, economic forces will
not permit tax and contribution increases to accommodate current replacement
levels, given the magnitude of the demographic changes to come.").
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lives.5 This funded pension can take the form of an individual
retirement account in which retirement funds are "earmarked"
for a specific employee who retains some decision-making au-
thority regarding the investment of funds in that account. The
shift in the kind of pension plans offered, particularly the
growth of the individual retirement account, places more re-
sponsibility on the individual for his or her retirement future
because he or she must in some cases elect to participate in a
pension program and obtain an optimal performance in his or
her investing.
If this new "funded" way of producing retirement income is
to succeed-and there is no certainty in this regard6-individu-
als will clearly require assistance in order to meet their saving
and investing responsibilities, which naturally leads to the
issue of investor education or training for ordinary people.
Investor education raises, in turn, many subsidiary matters,
such as the nature of the education, the identity of the proper
party or parties to conduct it, the manner of its delivery, its
capacity actually to assist individual investors and, significant-
ly, the role of government in this education.7 In another Arti-
cle, this Author examines investor education in the United
States and suggests that U.S. culture makes it a, but by no
means the only, "natural" solution to the responsibility of edu-
cating ordinary people for saving and investing for their retire-
s See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PRIVATE PENSIONS: MOST EMPLOYERS
THAT OFFER PENSIONS USE DEFINED CONTRIBUTION PLANS 4-9 (GAO/GGD-97-1,
Oct. 1996) (presenting statistics of growth in "defined contribution" plans in the
United States); Olivia S. Mitchell et al., Introduction: Assessing the Challenges to
the Pension System, in POSITIONING PENSIONS FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 1,
2-5 (Michael S. Gordon et al., eds., 1997) (explaining U.S. shift to defined contri-
bution plans).
6 See STEVEN A. SASS, THE PROMISE OF PRIVATE PENSIONS: THE FIRST HUN-
DRED YEARS 253 (1997) ("The success of the new initiative would thus seem to de-
pend on an economy far more tranquil, and households far more prescient, than
any seen in the past."); BORSCH-SUPAN, supra note 3, at 11 ("Managing the return
risk of funded pensions on an individual level requires in most OECD countries
more experience; exceptions are the Anglo-Saxon countries. Households have to
'experience' the force of compound interest to learn that starting too late with
saving is very expensive and increases risk exposure.").
' The shift from PAYG to funded plans has a libertarian and anti-government
flavor because so many PAYG pension schemes are governmental and because
governmental provision of pensions comes at a cost. See BORSCH-SUPAN, supra note
3, at 7, 13 (observing that governmental provision of pensions adds costs to
intergenerational transfers).
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ment here.' Specifically, for a long time there have been large,
active capital markets in the United States; investing in them
is a part of ordinary life for many Americans. With individual
retirement plans (particularly those known as "defined contri-
bution plans"), the tremendous growth in the mutual fund
industry, and the increasing technological ease of securities
trading for ordinary individuals, investing is now becoming
even more commonplace Individuals thus need and, given
the "self-help" ideology prevalent in the United States, expect
education to assist them in their investing.
Yet, investor education could be even more important
abroad than it is here. Demographic pressures on PAYG pen-
sions exist outside the United States, and, in many developed
countries, the situation is much worse than in this country
because of the increase in the number of elderly in relation to
the working part of the population and the significant govern-
ment involvement in the provision of pensions.'0 Policymakers
abroad are, therefore, increasingly interested in funded sys-
tems and even in individual pension accounts." Any alloca-
tion of responsibility for retirement planning to non-U.S. indi-
viduals would, of course, have to be accompanied by investor
education. In this country, there have been at least twenty
years of experimentation with individual pensions in a culture
and economy that favor capital market investing. In other
countries, not only will funded pensions be relatively new, but
they will also appear in situations where capital markets have
not been strong and capital market investing uncommon. Thus,
' See James A. Fanto, We're All Capitalists Now: The Importance, Nature,
Provision and Regulation of Investor Education, 49 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 104,
126-35 (forthcoming 1998) [hereinafter We're All Capitalists Now].
' See id. at 113-17.
10 See GROUP OF TEN, supra note 1, at 5-7 (presenting statistics about longevi-
ty and increasing ratio of retirees to workers in developed countries).
" See Glenn Cooper & Peter Scherer, Can We Afford to Grow Old?. OECD
OBSERVER June-July 1998, at 20, 22 ("Such alternatives [considered by OECD
countries] include encouraging privately-funded pensions, promoting increased per-
sonal savings and expecting individuals to plan for their own retirement."). There
is much anecdotal evidence on this point. See, e.g., Ellen E. Schultz, U.S. Asset
Managers Want Piece of Fattening 401(k)s Overseas, WALL ST. J., Nov. 20, 1997, at
C1 (describing growth in non-U.S. defined contribution plans).
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investor education in such countries has the dual purpose of
both helping ordinary people in their investment decision-mak-
ing and introducing them to capital markets. 2
It is, therefore, important to consider investor education in
an international perspective as part of a conference that stud-
ies worldwide transformations in Social Security and pensions.
Part I of this Article examines in greater detail the background
to investor education, particularly the reasons for the shift
from PAYG pensions to funded and defined contribution plans,
which include demographic pressures, the costs of government
provision of pensions and efforts to promote capital market
investing. It also discusses the educational implications of the
particular need that ordinary people outside the United States
have for investor education because of their unfamiliarity with
market capitalism. Part II highlights issues raised by the in-
troduction of investor education in cultures different from that
in the United States. This Part identifies the central purpose
of such education as creating simple rules or "norms" of saving
and investing. Because norms, including those related to edu-
cation, are culturally sensitive, investor education should be
flexible, developing at different speeds and in various ways,
often depending upon established cultural attitudes toward
saving, investing and even market capitalism. Part III discuss-
es the possibility of a worldwide movement towards one model
of investor education and makes a modest argument for a
limited kind of "model" convergence. This Article concludes by
emphasizing that investor education will likely become an
important focus in financial market regulation throughout the
modern world.
12 The same challenge for investor education exists in the United States when
it targets people who are unfamiliar with capital market investing, such as lower
income groups or certain ethnic groups.
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I. WORLDWIDE NEED FOR INVESTOR EDUCATION
The new-one could almost say renewed"-emphasis on
individual retirement planning and thus on investor education
is due to a few simple facts and predictions about future
trends. 4 Most pension schemes throughout the world are
PAYG, with the government often acting as the intermediary
between generations of workers as it both taxes the earnings of
current employees to pay for the income of current retirees
and, in some cases, accumulates a fund for the later retirement
of these employees. 5 The financial soundness of such plans is
based upon an adequate ratio of workers to retirees and even
upon a limited retirement period for the latter. 6 Demograph-
ics, however, has steadily undermined PAYG systems as both
fertility and mortality rates have fallen. 7 In most developed
countries, there are simply fewer employed people available to
pay for the elderly's retirement needs. Current workers thus
face a bleak future in PAYG programs: For a given PAYG sys-
tem to continue to exist, current employees must pay ever
13 Old age pensions are a relatively recent phenomenon, dating only since the
second half of the 19th Century. Before their widespread use in the labor market,
individuals looked to themselves and their families for old-age provision. See SASS,
supra note 6, at 227-28 (summarizing early history of pensions that large busi-
nesses designed to attract and keep employees that they trained for specialized
positions); Assar Lindbeck, Incentives and Social Norms in Household Behavior, 87
AM. ECON. REV. 370, 375-76 (1997) (discussing saving and consumption norms and
observing that they helped people save on their own in order to survive before the
appearance of the welfare state).
' While predictions about demographics should be treated with caution, they
should still guide policy discussion. See GROUP OF TEN, supra note 1, at 7.
" See E. PHILIP DAVIS, PENSION FUNDS: RETIREMENT-INCOME SECURITY AND
CAPITAL MARKETS: AN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 233 (1994).
See GROUP OF TEN, supra note 1, at 7 (describing the "dependency rate": the
number of people over 65 as compared to active workers (those between 15 and
65)).
" See id. at 6-7 (presenting statistics concerning mortality and fertility in de-
veloped countries); U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, RETIREMENT INCOME: IMPLICA-
TIONS OF DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS FOR SOCIAL SECURITY AND PENSION REFORPI 17
(GAO/HEHS 97-81, July 1997) (chart showing steady longevity increase since 1940
in the United States and projected increase in the future). Another factor influenc-
ing the retirement situation is the declining labor participation of older persons at
increasingly younger ages. See generally JONATHAN GRUBER & DAVID WISE, SOCIAL
SECURITY PROGRAMS AND RETIREMENT AROUND THE WORLD 21 (National Bureau of
Econ. Research Working Paper No. 6134, 1997) (presenting table showing the So-
cial Security and tax incentives encouraging people to leave the work force in 11
developed countries).
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increasing taxes or "generational transfers" to the elderly,
without being certain, because of continued demographic
trends, that they will receive much retirement benefits them-
selves.'" In simple finance terms, the return to such employ-
ees on their retirement contributions is low or, in some cases,
negative. 9
If members of society were to agree, PAYG pension sys-
tems could continue despite these demographic pressures, and,
indeed, the present systems are by no means disappearing.
Yet, worldwide product market competition may make it diffi-
cult for such systems to endure, despite general popular sup-
port. A PAYG pension system imposes significant labor costs
on industries located in a country operating under such a sys-
tem. Because markets are increasingly global, companies locat-
ed in countries with such costs may be at a competitive disad-
vantage with those located in jurisdictions with lower pension
costs (or with pensions tailored closely to employee productivi-
ty, which effectively reduces such costs).2" Indeed, high labor
costs (which include the pension burden on both employers and
employees) may help explain unemployment in developed coun-
tries (e.g., France and Germany) as companies in those coun-
tries are reluctant to hire new employees and incur the result-
ing "social" expenses associated with them.2' Thus, generous
pension benefits structured as PAYG systems applicable to all
"' See, e.g., Barry Bosworth, What Economic Role for the Trust Funds?, in
SOCIAL SECURITY IN THE 21ST CENTURY 156 (Eric R. Kingson & James H. Schulz
eds., 1997) (discussing funding problems in the United States and its implications
for a typical U.S. worker).
'9 See, e.g., GARY BURTLESS & BARRY BOSWORTH, PRIVATIZING SOCIAL SECURITY:
THE TROUBLING TRADE-OFFS 10 (Brookings Policy Brief No. 14, 1997),
<www.brook.edu> (referring to the low rate of return on contributions for current
generations); see also Alan Murray, Boomers May Not Like Social Security 'Return,'
WALL ST. J., Jan. 12, 1998, at Al (referring to a Heritage Foundation study that
identifies a rate of return for a single male born in 1960 with an average income
as being 0.7%). See generally U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, SOCIAL SECURITY:
DIFFERENT APPROACHES FOR ADDRESSING PROGRAM SOLVENCY 12-23 (GAO/HEHS-
98-33, June 1998) (discussing solvency issues related to U.S. Social Security pro-
gram) [hereinafter GAO, SOCIAL SECURITY].
20 See Michael C. Jensen, The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit, and the
Failure of Internal Control Systems, 48 J. FIN. 830, 835-47 (1993) (describing
worldwide competition among world-class companies).
21 See BORSCH-SUPAN, supra note 3, at 4 (discussing economic pressures on
PAYG systems); GROUP OF TEN, supra note 1, at 10-12 (same).
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employees22 may not be sustainable if a country wants its
companies to compete in world markets or keep them from
relocating to other jurisdictions.'s
In addition to worldwide competitive business pressures, a
government's major role in a PAYG system can undermine the
system's continued viability. There are many reasons for the
loss of confidence in government action during the past several
decades, some of them general and others specific to pensions.
It is, by now, commonly known that government officials do
not serve as neutral arbiters on most policy issues, but are
often "captured" by interest groups and/or are "interested"
parties in their own right.' A PAYG system may represent a
political solution to social disruption, one that is no longer
needed in current circumstances but that remains because it
benefits, at others' expense (e.g., the young and employees in
non-unionized industries),'s certain politically powerful groups
(e.g., organized labor) or members of a government bureaucra-
cy, who would find their regulatory purpose undercut if the
pension system disappeared. In fact, in some social activities,
the costs of government involvement may outweigh the bene-
fits. The government may inefficiently run a PAYG system26
Pensions are always costly to employers, but the employee productivity pen-
sions induce may more than justify their costs. See RICHARD A. IPPOLITO, PENSION
PLANS AND EMPLOYEE PERFORMANCE: EVIDENCE, ANALYSIS, AND POLICY 85-89
(1997) (arguing that Section 401(k) plans are popular because they enable compa-
nies to tailor retirement benefits to worker productivity).
2 See DANI RODRIK, HAS GLOBALIZATION GONE Too FAR? 24-25 (1997) (observ-
ing that, although social arrangements supporting generous pensions might endure,
it is difficult to insist that employers and capitalists bear a heavy pension burden
when it is becoming increasingly easier for them to move their operations and
funds to other jurisdictions).
24 See, e.g., FRED S. MCCHESNEY, MONEY FOR NOTHING: POLITICIANS, RENT
EXTRACTION, AND POLITICAL EXTORTION 41 (1997) (suggesting that politicians, in
effect, solicit "bribes" or "rents" from private firms, which pay so that politicians
will not extract profits from them by legislation and regulation); Jonathan R.
Macey, Administrative Agency Obsolescence and Interest Group Formation: A Case
Study of the SEC at Sixty, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 909, 913 (1994) (describing inter-
est group involvement before the Securities and Exchange Commission and the
Commission's own efforts to justify its continued existence).
2 See, e.g., DAVIS, supra note 15, at 19 ("Certainly, studies of pension coverage
show that workers with higher income and longer job tenure, as well as those in
large and unionized firms, are most likely to be covered by private pensions.")
(citation omitted).
" See BORSCH-SUPAN, supra note 3, at 13 (observing that, by providing gener-
ous pensions, the government makes intergenerational transfers costly because
1998]
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and not obtain the best use of, or best return on, surplus pen-
sion funds that do not have to be expended on current retir-
ees.
27
Another pressure on a PAYG system is a country's need to
produce a securities market and, particularly, an equity "cul-
ture." Capital markets provide companies with the most exten-
sive kinds and, in most cases, the cheapest possibilities of
finance (e.g., by pricing better a company's risks, by widely
disseminating information about the company, by offering
financial products adjusted to its risks); provide investors with
the best opportunities for investment (e.g., by offering numer-
ous investment products tailored to an investor's particular
investment and liquidity needs); and provide countries with a
profitable domestic industry (e.g., financial services)., Capital
market financing is, therefore, critical for the success of a
country's industries that compete in world markets because,
without it, such industries are at a disadvantage with their
competitors from countries with capital market financing that
offers cheaper capital. Yet, capital markets cannot exist with-
out investors, whether institutions or retail investors, the lat-
ter investing either directly or through the institutions. Thus,
PAYG systems not only use funds that would otherwise be
available for capital market investing, but they also tend to
invest funds outside capital markets in accordance with the
often political decisions of those in charge of such funds, not
funds flow from the young to the old, and then back again to the young as be-
quests).
27 This is a key issue behind Social Security reform in the United States. The
Social Security Administration invests in U.S. government securities surplus funds
(known as "trust" funds) from payroll taxes not needed to pay for the retirement
income of existing retirees. One proposal for increasing the return on such funds
is to permit their investment in non-government, particularly equity, securities. See
generally U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, SOCIAL SECURITY FINANCING: IMPLICA-
TIONS OF GOVERNMENT STOCK INVESTING FOR THE TRUST FUND, THE FEDERAL
BUDGET, AND THE ECONOMY 4-6 (GAO/AIMDIHEHS-98-74, Apr. 1998) (discussing
implications of shifting Social Security trust funds from government securities to
stocks).
2 See generally Frank H. Easterbrook, International Corporate Differences: Mar-
kets or Law?, J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 23, 27 (Winter 1997).
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necessarily with economic rationality. 9 As a result, PAYG
sys-tems can impede the creation of fully functioning securities
markets."
All of the above pressures encourage the creation of "fund-
ed," as opposed to PAYG, pensions and even to individually
funded pensions. Funding pension plans removes intergenera-
tional transfers, reduces the pension costs for companies (or
allows them to tailor pensions more to employee performance),
eliminates the government's role as an intermediary in the
provision of pensions and boosts capital markets with an infu-
sion of new funds and investors. Funded plans need not be
individualized, for an employer could provide a collective re-
tirement vehicle for employees in the traditional "defined bene-
fit" plan.3 However, the worldwide trend, as in the United
States, is likely to be to establish individual plans not only
because they provide more flexibility to companies in terms of
labor management but also because the traditional defined
benefit plan suffers some of the same problems as government
PAYG programs (e.g., they favor older employees at the ex-
pense of the younger). Moreover, the traditional defined bene-
fit plan is costly to administer (e.g., demands actuarial exper-
tise and insurance for the pension benefits) and may not be
2, Cf. DAVIS, supra note 15, at 170-78 (discussing "allocating" effects of funded
pensions).
30 See GROUP OF TEN, supra note 1, at 29-30 (describing how funded pensions
can increase capital market growth, with resulting benefits); Hans J. Blommestein,
Pension Funds and Financial Markets, OECD OBSERVER June-July 1998, at 23-27
(describing benefits of the investment of pension funds in capital markets). But see
HELMUT REISEN, LIBERALISING FOREIGN INVESTMENTS BY PENSION FUNDS: POSITIVE
AND NORMATIVE ASPECTS 16-17 (OECD Dev. Ctr. Technical Paper No. 120, 1997)
(arguing that evidence shows that funded pensions do not necessarily improve
stock market growth, often because such pensions cannot invest in equity securi-
ties, but that they do improve the banking industry, which may lead to capital
market development since banks provide credit to securities firms). The relation-
ship between funded pensions and capital markets is highly complex and is not
simply an issue of positive correlation. See, e.g., GROUP OF TEN, supra note 1, at
23-24 (pointing out how funded systems could drive down stock returns by increas-
ing the supply of funds looking for returns).
", Under the typical U.S. defined benefit plan, an employer provides an em-
ployee with a pension calculated in accordance with some set formula (e.g., based
upon years of service and a percentage of pay). See generally EMPLOYEE BENEFIT
RESEARCH INST., FUNDAMENTALS OF EMPLOYEE BENEFIT PROGRAMS 69-70 (5th ed.
1997). The employer sets aside, invests and controls the funds for the provision of
the retirement income (in the U.S., under complex statutory guidelines).
10911998]
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well suited to a highly mobile workforce. 2 Thus, the future is
with the individualized retirement plan throughout the devel-
oped world, barring the possibility of a political "backlash" in
times of capital market stress."
As referenced earlier, the above shift from a PAYG system
to individualized pensions has occurred in the United States.
In fact, the popularity of defined contribution plans has in-
creased to such an extent in the United States that they have
become the dominant form of pension plan.34 Even current
reform proposals for the federal government's PAYG system,
Social Security (which does not provide the generous retire-
ment coverage offered in the government-sponsored PAYG
pensions of other countries),35 advocate that employees should
have a portion of their Social Security contributions placed in
individual accounts that would be subject to their investment
decision-making.36 Such rising popularity may be attributed
32 See RICHARD DISNEY, CAN WE AFFORD TO GROW OLDER? A PERSPECTIVE ON
THE ECONOMICS OF AGING 110-21 (1996) (explaining how, in defined benefit plans,
older workers benefit at the expense of younger workers as they are given early
retirement, which typically requires more contributions from the younger); SASS,
supra note 6, at 240-41 (arguing that defined contribution plans might simply be
more suitable in a labor environment where highly-educated employees "rent" their
services to many different companies over their working lives, which means that
they could not take full advantage of defined benefit plans that require several
years for vesting); Robert M. Ball & Thomas N. Bethell, Bridging the Centuries:
The Case for Traditional Social Security, in SOCIAL SECURITY IN THE 21ST CENTU-
RY, supra note 18, at 259-60, 289 n.1 (attributing the decline of defined benefit
plans to employer cost savings).
' Cf. Mark J. Roe, Backlash, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 217 (1998) (arguing that
some degree of inefficiency may be built into economic systems to address the
potential for political backlash: that is, although one system may be optimal from
an economic point of view, it may lead to political instability, which results in the
existence of a "second best" system that avoids such political problems). The above
statement needs to be qualified; it is often difficult, both politically and practically,
to abandon a PAYG system. See GAO, SOCIAL SECURITY, supra note 19, at 62-64
(pointing out the transition difficulties of moving to a funded Social Security sys-
tem, particularly the need for current workers to pay both for present retirees and
for their own future retirement).
" See supra note 5.
31 See GROUP OF TEN, supra note 1, at 20 (presenting a table describing fea-
tures of public pensions in major developed countries; in France, for example, a
public pension replaces 70% of one's pre-retirement income, as opposed to 43% and
40%, respectively, in the U.S. and U.K. (figures referring to all income groups
taken together)).
36 See, e.g., NATIONAL COMMON ON RETIREMENT POLICY, THE 21ST CENTURY RE-
TIREMENT SECURITY PLAN 2 (May 19, 1998) (summarizing its reform recommenda-
tions on Social Security, which include permitting individuals to direct a portion of
1092 [Vol. 64: 3
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to the fertile environment of the U.S. capital markets. These
markets have existed for some time, and individual investing,
for better or for worse,37 is part of U.S. culture. In recent
years, the mutual fund industry, devoted to providing the indi-
vidual investor with professional money management and
numerous investment products, has greatly expanded.38 From
the educational perspective, Americans have always embraced
an ideology of self-improvement and social advancement
through education." Therefore, although individual retire-
ment plans, with the help of an investor education to help
ordinary people create optimal portfolios, are not the panacea
for all retirement issues,4" they make sense in the
their retirement contributions to individual Social Security accounts); MARTIN
FELDSTEIN & ANDREW SAMWIC, TWO PERCENT PERSONAL RETIREMENT ACCOUNTS:
THEIR POTENTIAL EFFECTS ON SOCIAL SECURITY TAX RATES AND NATIONAL SAVING
1-2 (National Bureau of Econ. Research Working Paper No. 6540, 1998) (proposing
plan to give people an income tax credit to deposit up to 2% of their income in
individual retirement accounts for Social Security. When they withdrew the funds,
such amounts would reduce their Social Security receipts by 75 cents for each $1;
yet the federal government would limit how such funds could be invested).
"7 Professor Lynn Stout is probably the foremost U.S. legal academic criticizing
the participation of the individual investor in securities markets. See, e.g., Lynn A.
Stout, Are Stock Markets Costly Casinos? Disagreement, Market Failure, and Secu-
rities Regulation, 81 VA. L. REV. 611, 668 (1995) (suggesting that investors are
irrational optimists); Lynn A. Stout, Technology, Transaction Costs, and Investor
Welfare: Is A Motley Fool Born Every Minute?, 75 WASH. U. L.Q. 791, 812 (1997)
(suggesting that investors, confused about differing sources of securities informa-
tion, will engage in excessive speculation).
38 See INVESTMENT CO. INST., 1998 MUTUAL FUND FACT BOOK 1 (1998) (de-
scribing growth in total assets in mutual funds from $1.07 trillion in 1990 to $4.5
trillion in 1997); see id. at 16 (noting that the number of mutual funds has more
than doubled since 1990); see id. at 44 (observing that approximately 16% of the
$6.6 trillion of total retirement assets are invested in mutual funds).
"' See, e.g., MILTON FRIEDMAN & ROSE FRIEDMAN, FREE TO CHOOSE: A PERSON-
AL STATEMENT 144 (1980) ("Mostly, [the establishment of the school system in the
United States] simply reflected the importance that was attached by the communi-
ty to the ideal of equality of opportunity.").
40 For example, they do not address wealth inequalities resulting from differ-
ences in generosity of pension plans (or from the lack of such plans for much of
the population), as well as problems that may surface in the future, such as the
difficulty of making a high return in equity markets when pension funds are bid-
ding up stock prices. See, e.g., Blommestein, supra note 30, at 25; see also GAO,
SOCIAL SECURITY, supra note 19, at 56 ("Even if the market experienced no dra-
matic or long-lasting downturns, the normal market cycles will create 'winners'
and losers,' depending on when and how workers invest their 'Social Security'
assets in the market and when they liquidate their holdings. Individuals with
similar work histories could receive substantially different benefits.").
1998]
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United States where they can develop in a highly favorable
environment.
If countries shift from PAYG pensions to individually fund-
ed systems, they must replicate the U.S. situation in many
respects, particularly with regard to the attitudes towards, and
capabilities of, investing of ordinary people. Academic litera-
ture has discussed the harmonization of worldwide financial
elites, which include market regulators, institutional invest-
ment managers and even (if I may be so bold as to say) aca-
demics, who receive similar professional training and have the
same values concerning international business and finance.41
Yet there has been little attention to the necessary harmoniza-
tion of the "masses" in financial understanding. Ordinary in-
vestors, however, are as critical to the survival of capitalism as
are the elites and, without their support and participation,
institutional investors and capital markets would not exist.
42
Moreover, any speculation about the importance, and perhaps
even the inevitability, of the U.S. model of individualized pen-
sions raises all of the issues and qualifications about the ad-
vantages or dominance of one culture (i.e., Anglo-Saxon) over
others (i.e., Continental, Asian) that has recently characterized
corporate governance debates. 3
Education must help prepare ordinary people in developed
countries (and even in developing ones)" for the "new world"
of individualized pension planning and self-directed pensions.
Although investor education has significant and difficult tasks
" See generally YVES DEZALAY & BRYANT G. GARTH, DEALING IN VIRTUE: IN-
TERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF A
TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER (1996).
42 See CONFERENCE BD., 1 INSTITUTIONAL INVESTMENT REPORT: PATTERNS OF
INSTITUTIONAL INVESTMENT AND CONTROL IN THE UNITED STATES 7 (1997) (noting
that, of the largest U.S. companies, only 47% of the equity capital is owned by
institutions). The importance of individual investors has reappeared in the current
stock market volatility, as policymakers worry that such investors will lose confi-
dence in securities markets.
See, e.g., Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, A Survey of Corporate Gover-
nance, 52 J. FIN. 737, 769-73 (1997) (describing evolution of corporate governance
systems).
44 See HEMANT SHAH, TOwARD BETTER REGULATION OF PRIVATE PENSION FUNDS
(World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 1791, 1997) (discussing individu-
alized pensions in Latin America, particularly Chile); DIMITRI VITTAS, THE ARGEN-
TINE PENSION REFORM AND ITS RELEVANCE FOR EASTERN EUROPE (World Bank
Policy Research Working Paper No. 1819, 1997).
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in this country, it has an even more onerous program in other
countries where there has been little or no investment "cul-
ture," where the government has often dominated the economy
in a highly paternalistic way, where wealth has been concen-
trated in the hands of elites and/or where banks or insurance
companies provide the main financing to companies and the
only investment products for ordinary investors. The shift to
individualized pensions may be traumatic in such situations,
not only because of the absence of familiarity with the invest-
ment world but also because of interest group and political
resistance to individual investing, and even to capitalism itself,
and because of fear and suspicion of capital markets by ordi-
nary individuals. U.S. investor education aims to make an
individual competent in a socially acceptable and desirable
activity (itself not always an easy task);4 5 in most other coun-
tries, investor education must change attitudes about investing
and teach investment basics. It makes sense, therefore, to
consider the implications of investor education programs in
these more "educationally challenging" cultures.
II. THE CHALLENGES OF NON-U.S. INVESTOR EDUCATION
An assumption here is that culture shapes the format and
delivery of investor education. Therefore, investor education
should not be the same in all countries: there should be vari-
ous forms of successful education. The main goal of investor
education is to change "norms" of saving and investing of ordi-
nary people. Because common behavioral norms are so much a
part of everyday life and thus inseparably linked with a given
culture, education creating or affecting them will have to
"make sense" within a culture in order to be effective. To sup-
port such assertions, it is important to discuss the relationship
between norms and investor education. It is then interesting to
discuss potential differences in investor education programs
occasioned by cultural differences and the strengths and weak-
nesses of such programs.46
See Fanto, We're All Capitalists Now, supra note 8, at 26-31.
'G As is clear from the following, this Author accepts that culture likely affects
saving and investing behavior. This is by no means an uncontested proposition.
See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER D. CARROLL ET AL., DOES CULTURAL ORIGIN AFFECT SAVING
BEHAVIOR? EVIDENCE FROM IMMIGRANTS (National Bureau of Econ. Research Work-
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The central goals of investor education can be simply
stated: to encourage people to save funds for retirement (i.e., to
defer consumption during the working period of one's life in
order to have resources available for retirement) and to invest
such funds in accordance with the basic teachings of finance.'
These teachings suggest that an individual follow a life-cycle
approach to investing, which means adjusting the allocation of
kinds of securities in his or her portfolio over the different
stages of the life cycle.' There are many possible qualifica-
tions and additions to this basic training, such as teaching
people to take advantage of tax-favored retirement vehicles
and to be generally sensitive to fees in saving and investing.
Investor education should also introduce those completely
unfamiliar with the "investment world" not only to various
kinds of investments and market professionals but also to the
nature, structure and regulation of the securities markets. It is
important to emphasize, however, that the goal of investor
education is not to make ordinary people familiar with sophis-
ticated finance and investment strategies but to give them an
elementary background for understanding and doing, saving
and investing (or for discussing their portfolio knowledgeably
with an investment professional). Finance professionals de-
bate amongst themselves the benefits of investment strategies.
They all agree, however, on the importance of certain basics,
such as asset allocation, and on the harm caused by an
investor's neglect of such basics.49
People need basic knowledge to save and invest well, but it
must come to them in a particular form, which introduces the
relevancy of norms. Behavioral studies show that people be-
have optimally in accordance with their knowledge if they can
follow simple rules that allow them to put their knowledge into
ing Paper No. 6568, 1998) (presenting economic debate about the importance of
culture in savings behavior and evidence that savings behavior of immigrants to
the United States is unrelated to that in their country of origin).
" For a more complete discussion of the nature of investor education, see
Fanto, We're All Capitalists Now, supra note 8, at 125-35.
8 See, e.g., BURTON G. MALKIEL, A RANDOM WALK DOWN WALL STREET 400-21
(6th ed. 1996) (presenting a basic explanation of life-cycle investing with differing
asset allocations depending upon one's stage in life).
' See, e.g., Zvi Bodie & Dwight B. Crane, Personal Investing: Advice, Theory,
and Evidence from a Survey of TLAA-CREF Participants 4-5 (May 28, 1997) (on
file with author) (summarizing basic investing principles).
1096 [Vol. 64: 3
COMPARATIVE INVESTOR EDUCATION
action.5" The rules allow them to overcome the conceptual and
willpower impediments to carrying out the desired action. With
respect to saving and investing, these impediments typically
arise because of an individual's excessive fear of risk, impul-
sive spending behavior and/or unwillingness to plan for the
future.5 Effective investor education must change behavior by
giving individuals guidelines that they can readily apply with-
out much thought or reflection and that thus become habitu-
al.52 Such guidelines are actually informal norms or rules
whose prevalence in a given society owes much to their sim-
plicity.53 In fact, because a substantial amount of human be-
50 See generally Richard H. Thaler & Hersh M. Shefrn, An Economic Theory of
Self-Control, in RICHARD H. THALER, QUASI-RATIONAL ECONOMICS 77, 81 (1991) (ob-
serving how people often use learned "self-imposed rules of thumb" to reduce deci-
sion-making discretion); Hersh M. Shefrin & Richard H. Thaler, The Behavioral
Life-Cycle Hypothesis, in THALER, supra, at 97 (describing usefulness of "habitual
rules" in enabling individuals to resist impulses).
", See Richard H. Thaler, Psychology and Savings Policies, in 84 AEA PAPERS
& PROCEEDINGS 186 (1994) (arguing that psychological factors affect investors so
that they do not perform optimal life-cycle investing); see also Christine Jolls et
al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REv. 1471, 1476
(1998) (discussing data calling into question rationality of economic actors); Cass R.
Sunstein, Behavioral Analysis of Law, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1179-84 (1997)
(describing psychological pressures as aversion to loss and to extremes of any
kind, unrealistic optimism, overconfidence, etc.).
52 Of course, some people want, and can act upon, much knowledge, even
though it is surprising how many people knowledgeable about investing do not
follow some elementary investing principles. Cf Brad M. Barber & Terrance
Odean, The Common Stock Investment Performance of Individual Investors (July
1998) (on file with author) (discussing negative performance (in relation to a
benchmark index) of individual investors due to excessive trading); Terrance
Odean, Are Investors Reluctant to Realize Their Losses?, 53 J. FIN. 1775 (1998)
(discussing tendency of investors to hold on to "losing" investments for too long).
Yet, investor education means creating an educational framework that can be ap-
plied throughout all levels of society. This Author assumes that investor education,
particularly if it addresses psychological issues, can be effective in producing opti-
mal investor behavior. This is not an uncontested proposition. See, e.g., Matthew
Rabin, Psychology and Economics, 36 J. ECON. LIT. 11, 31-32 (1998) (observing
that learning sometimes reinforces biases and impressions).
See generally Lindbeck, supra note 13, at 375-76 (discussing saving and con-
sumption norms); Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation
of Norms, 96 MICH. L. REV. 338, 351 (1997) (defining "norms" as obligations that
the law does not impose but that can be prevalent in groups or even throughout
society); Richard A. Posner, Social Norms and the Law: An Economic Approach, 87
AM. ECON. REV. 365, 365 (1997) ("By 'social norm' ('norm' for short) I shall mean
a rule that is neither promulgated by an official source, such as a court or a leg-
islature, nor enforced by the threat of legal sanctions, yet is regularly complied
with (otherwise it wouldn't be a rule).") (footnote omitted).
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havior in society is based upon such norms, current legal policy
analyses study their importance and interaction with law.54
The norms of saving and investing to be created by inves-
tor education must be built on, and interact with, the accept-
able ways of behaving in a given culture. Indeed, to be effec-
tive, investor education must try to use, rather than ignore,
existing related norms-unless they undermine optimal saving
and investing. In any culture, one must understand not only
the norms currently affecting (or likely to affect) these activi-
ties but also the interaction between such norms and formal or
informal education in order to predict, as a policy matter, the
kind of investor education appropriate for each particular set-
ting. This analysis is difficult because it is not focusing on the
behavior of a small, easily identifiable group or an "elite," but
on the norms of the entire population and thus on certain
foundational features of a culture.
For example, the relevant U.S. cultural setting includes
the following features (among others) that shape investor edu-
cation. As noted earlier, in the United States there is a history
of capital market financing and a general popular familiarity
with (even a "fatal attraction" to)55 the stock market. The
number of people unfamiliar with investing is shrinking as
this activity has become ordinary, not reserved by right or
privilege to a small group.56 Because there exists an ideology
of social advancement in this country that is based on financial
achievement, and because investing is a way of increasing,
sometimes significantly, one's income, the U.S. ideological
grounds for saving and investing education are propitious.57
"' For citations to the legal and economic literature, see McAdams, supra note
53, at 343-50.
"- See ROBERT J. SHILLER, MARKET VOLATILITY 59 (1989) (discussing how peo-
ple are attracted to investing much in the same way that they are drawn to gam-
bling).
" Indeed, an important focus of U.S. retirement education policymakers is on
the groups (e.g., certain minority groups, women, the poor) who remain unfamiliar
with investing. See generally CHRISTOPHER CONTE, THE NATIONAL SUMMIT ON RE-
TIREMENT SAVINGS: AGENDA BACKGROUND MATERIALS 16-17 (1998); see also James
S. Hirsch, How Jesse Brown Gets Reluctant Customers To Dive Into Stocks, WALL
ST. J., Sept. 17, 1997, at Al (describing effort of African-American broker to in-
troduce others of his ethnic group to stock investing).
7 Cf YANKELOVICH PARTNERS INC., 1997 ANNUAL SIA INVESTOR SURVEY:
INVESTORS' ATTITUDES TOWARDS THE SECURITIES INDUSTRY 5 (1997) (in an investor
survey prepared for the Securities Industry Association, 64% of investors surveyed
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Many ordinary people simply want to share in a wealth-gener-
ating process and to learn how to engage in the activities
themselves.58 Moreover, U.S. investors can use rapidly-ex-
panding, new communication technology, given its popularity
and prevalence here.59
Some additional features of the U.S. cultural situation
support, and others undermine, the inculcation of saving and
investing norms. Strong consumption norms run counter to
saving behavior, and education cannot work unless it teaches
that deferred consumption is preferable to present consump-
tion (e.g., because current saving and investing allows greater
consumption later).0 U.S. norms and attitudes relating to
education, which are relevant for investor education, reflect an
ideology of self-improvement through education and an expec-
tation of a right to education co-existing with a highly decen-
tralized, even if standardized, educational system.6 Education
is viewed not necessarily as a one-time experience but as a
continuous process available in different contexts from many
different kinds of education providers.62 In many respects,
had a favorable view of the securities industry) [hereinafter 1997 SIA SURVEY]; see
also DANIEL FIScHEL, PAYBACRI THE CONSPIRACY TO DESTROY MICHAEL MILKEN
AND HIS FINANCIAL REVOLUTION 1-2 (1995) (citing Alexis de Tocqueville's observa-
tion that the pursuit of wealth is fundamental to American culture).
"' Although one always hears stories that it is time to get out of the stock
market when even a taxi driver discusses "hot tips" for securities trading, this is
nonsense, despite the current stock market volatility. When even lower income
individuals of a country care about investing, the country has a good basis upon
which to build a solid investor education program.
"' See 1997 SIA SURVEY, supra note 57, at 12 (referring to growing numbers of
investors who use personal computers to obtain investment information). But see
ARTHUR B. KENNICKELL & MYRON L. KwAsT, WHO USES ELECTRONIC BANKING?
RESULTS FROM THE 1995 SURVEY OF CONSUMER FINANCES 18 (Federal Reserve Bd.
Fin. and Econs. Discussion Series No. 1997-35, 1997) (on the basis of consumer re-
search, arguing that consumer use of electronic means to make saving and invest-
ing decisions is very limited). See generally John C. Coffee, Jr., Brave New World?:
The Impact(s) of the Internet on Modern Securities Regulation, 52 BUS. LAW. 1195
(1997) (discussing the effect of new technology-particularly the World Wide
Web-on securities regulation).
60 This is, in fact, how investor education for teenagers is sometimes presented.
See, e.g., MERRILL LYNCH, THE FURTHER ADVENTURES OF SAVIN' DAVE AND THE
COMPOUNDERS (1997) (comic book with a saving and investing message). On U.S.
cultural norms that encourage consumption, see B. DOUGLAS BERNHEIM, THE VAN-
ISHING NEST EGG: REFLECTIONS ON SAVING IN AMERICA 66-92 (1991) (discussing
how U.S. popular culture encourages present consumption).
61 See Fanto, We're All Capitalists Now, supra note 8, at 118-19.
62 Supporting evidence for this remark is the prevalence and popularity of
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education providers compete with their services and products
in a "market" for education. A further ideological view affecting
the delivery of investor education is that neither the state nor
federal government is seen as necessarily the most competent
party to accomplish, in any centralized fashion, all social tasks,
including education.63
What implications does the above have for U.S. investor
education? The U.S. educational system generally provides
investor education to young people but not in a standardized
way. Its provision varies from state to state, often appearing in
a basic economic or finance class or in a revised home econom-
ics course.' 4 The curriculum, crafted by educators, financial
regulators and professionals in the financial services industry,
is designed to convey skills that will enable ordinary people to
participate in the U.S. investment world.' The most salient
characteristic of U.S. investor education is that it has become a
market commodity supplied by a bewildering number of pro-
viders, both profit-making, nonprofit and even governmental,
who offer it to different kinds of people (e.g., children, adults,
sophisticated, unsophisticated) in different ways.6 In light of
U.S. ideology, it is not surprising that much investor education
involves essentially self-education that allows individuals to
continuing education programs.
6 Cf MARK J. ROE, STRONG MANAGERS, WEAK OWNERS: THE POLITICAL ROOTs
OF AMERICAN CORPORATE FINANCE 29-31 (1994) (citing American experiences of
resistance to centralized government). One has only to think of the school voucher
movement as an example of this populist attitude as it affects education. See
ANDREI SHLEIFER, STATE VERSUS PRIVATE OWNERSHIP 20-25 (National Bureau of
Econ. Research Working Paper No. 6665, 1998).
64 See generally B. DOUGLAS BERNHEIM ET AL., EDUCATION AND SAVING: THE
LONG-TERM EFFECTS OF HIGH SCHOOL FINANCIAL CURRICULUM MANDATES 3 (Na-
tional Bureau of Econ. Research Working Paper No. 6085, 1997) (presenting back-
ground, and empirical research on results, of high school financial education).
" See, e.g., NATIONAL INST. FOR CONSUMER EDUC., THE BASICS OF INVESTING:
A GUIDE FOR EDUCATORS (1997) (providing model curriculum for school investor
education course).
" See Fanto, We're All Capitalists Now, supra note 8, at 142-45 (discussing
investor education products and services offered by profit-making and nonprofit
firms). For example, nearly all consumer-oriented financial services firms provide
investor education, see, e.g., <www.fidelity.com> (educating consumers about the
importance of saving, elementary finance, kinds of investments, tax-reducing retire-
ment options, kinds of mutual funds, investment basics, asset-allocation strategies,
etc.), as do nonprofit organizations whose mandate is to help ordinary investors,
see, e.g., <www.aarp.org/finwhat.html> (web site of American Association of Re-
tired Persons ("AARP)).
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teach themselves about saving and investing when managing
their own portfolios. 7 This education makes considerable use
of the new computer technology with many providers offering
educational services on the World Wide Web or in CD-Rom
form.
68
Investor education will be different (or, if it does not yet
exist, it should be different) in a country that does not have
the U.S. ideology of individualism and consumerism, familiari-
ty with and attraction to investing, decentralized and continu-
ous education and favorable view of technology. A global "one-
size-fits-all" approach to investor education will probably not
work. A few examples suggest the reasons supporting such
assertion. If there is little social mobility (or a perception of
such) in a particular country, if the mobility depends on per-
sonal characteristics other than wealth (e.g., ethnic group or
family background) and/or if investing is seen to be an activity
of only a certain "class," the investor education for ordinary
people in such a country cannot be identical to that in the
United States. It could hardly invite them to participate in a
world from which they know they will be excluded for reasons
other than money, despite their acquisition of investing norms.
An education encouraging them to invest might also run coun-
ter to their own group or "class" identity by suggesting that
they should become proficient in capital market investing. In
another country, successful investor education might have to
build upon social or familial solidarity, as opposed to the ideol-
ogy of individual advancement common in the United
States.69
6' See, e.g., <www.plan.ml.comlinvestor> ("Investor Learning Center" of full-ser-
vice broker Merrill Lynch, which provides information and interactive forms to
design investment goals and portfolios).
"' See, e.g., Edward C. Baig, For Investors of All Stripes, A Cornucopia on the
Net, BUS. WK., Dec. 22, 1997, at 104 (detailing investor informational and educa-
tional resources on the World Wide Web).
", One thinks, for example, of the recent situation in Korea where investors
were encouraged (and apparently willing) to invest in securities of Korean com-
panies in order to stabilize its economy. This Author does not mean to present a
caricature of the "Old World" vs. the "New" or to deny that educators (and fman-
cial services firms) could use images of social and class advancement in their
investor education materials.
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Investor education would have to take a particular form in
a country without any tradition of capital market investing or
where such tradition had fallen into disuse for a lengthy period
of time because of a disruption in the domestic capital mar-
kets.70 Because of the general unfamiliarity with investing
activities that exists in such a country, investor education
must compensate for more than a mere lack of information
about investing and securities markets, even among the elite.
The absence of capital market investing creates other attitudes
and norms that will not disappear easily and that education
must also address (although education, alone, cannot create
capital market financing). Small capital markets, for example,
often go hand in hand with family ownership and/or bank
financing of companies.7 Ordinary people in such environ-
ments might be accustomed to investing only in small family-
run businesses or through banks or insurance companies
where they develop relations with bank professionals.72 In
these settings, individuals might either be suspicious of any
investor education that leads them away from their traditional
investments, or they might expect to deal with only known
financial professionals as education providers and be reluctant
to accept any others in this role. Providers of investor educa-
tion would have a significant challenge to overcome the suspi-
cion of capital market investing, and it is questionable whether
education alone, without something else (e.g., tax incentives,
changes in corporate and securities law to favor minority
"0 See generally William N. Goetzmann & Philippe Jorion, A Century of Global
Stock Markets (Dec. 1996) (on file with the author) (describing the history of capi-
tal markets and observing that the continuity of the U.S. markets owes much to
the fact that they have not been disrupted by war).
71 See, e.g., RAFAEL LA PORTA ET AL., CORPORATE OWNERSHIP AROUND THE
WORLD 19-20 (1998) (observing that of the largest corporations in the 27 richest
countries, using 20% as a control benchmark, only 36% of these firms are widely
held, and these come almost exclusively from the United States, United Kingdom,
Japan (i.e., countries with large capital markets). The dominant form of control is
family ownership for the rest of the firms).
72 See Jonathan R. Macey, Italian Corporate Governance: One American's Per-
spective, 1998 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 121, 140-43 (1998) (observing that, given the
dominance of Italian capital markets by wealthy families, ordinary people invest in
small, family-run enterprises outside such markets). But see Robert Bonte-
Friedheim, Italians Flock To Funds, WALL ST. J., Feb. 9, 1998, at C23 (observing
that Italians increasingly invest in mutual funds, including those concentrating on
Italian companies, because the companies "have realized that their cost of capital
falls if they become more investor friendly.").
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shareholders7") could induce people to try this activity. The
educational outcome, moreover, might not be optimal where
investors are willing to listen to only certain financial profes-
sionals, because the latter might design the education to favor
themselves and their investment products-a solution that may
not promote proper capital market financing.7
The kind of investor education suitable for this country,
which comes from numerous providers in various forms, often
delivered by sophisticated technology, for different age groups
and educational levels, may not be appropriate for a country
(e.g., France) where education is the product of a highly cen-
tralized, hierarchical government bureaucracy that attaches
enormous social value to the educational outcome.75 In such a
country, it is difficult to imagine credible investor education
coming from a source other than the government bureaucracy
(otherwise, it would not count as education) and not following
the standard educational model. It was long the boast of the
educational establishment in France (to continue the example)
that, at any time in the school day, the Minister of Education
could look at his curriculum and identify what was being
73 See LA PORTA ET AL., supra note 71, at 30 (discussing the legal reforms
needed to promote capital market investing in countries where majority sharehold-
ers abuse minorities). See also RAFAEL LA PORTA ET AL., AGENCY PROBLEMS AND
DIVIDEND POLICIES AROUND THE WORLD 20 (National Bureau of Econ. Research
Working Paper No. 6594, 1998) (observing that in civil law countries with weak
minority shareholder protection, growth companies have a higher dividend payout
ratio than mature companies (the opposite of the case in common law countries)
because, without a legal structure protecting these investors, such companies must
demonstrate to them that they will return funds in order to raise the needed
capital for growth).
"' See, e.g., Fund management: Opening Europe's Coffers, ECONOMIST, June 27,
1998, at 76, 78 (observing that German banks direct their customers to their own
investment finds and away from those of their Anglo-Saxon competitors). These
relationships may be eroding with more European-wide competition in investment
funds and may not foreclose other kinds of investor education. See, e.g.
<www.dai.de> (web site of Deutsches Aktieninstitut [German Share Institute] that
is devoted to educating ordinary Germans on investing). The Author thanks Bernd
Singhof for directing him to this web site.
71 See generally PIERRE BOURDIEU & JEAN-CLAUDE PASSERON, LA REPRODUC-
TION: ]tL MENTS POUR UNE THIORIE DU SYSTPME D'ENSEIGNEMENT (1970) (describing
French educational system and its effect on future success); see also MICHEL
BAUER & BPNtDICTE BERTIN-MOUROT, ADMINISTRATEURS ET DIRIGEANTS DU CAC
40: DES LOGIQUES SOCIALES D'AUTOCONTROLE AU COEUR DU GOUVERNEMENT
D'ENTREPRISE 15-19 (1997) (discussing social background of French company execu-
tives from owning families, high state officials and elite schools).
19981
BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW
taught in each class throughout the country.76 Therefore, in
French investor education, a French man or woman might be
taught to follow routinely a set strategy for investing (e.g.,
these are the rules for investing; apply them!). Although this
approach to education may not be the best for many activities,
even in France, it may be useful for inculcating simple rules
and norms of saving and investing and may be the most effec-
tive one in that particular country.
The above example suggests that investor education may
succeed even if it does not have the social, normative and insti-
tutional background of the United States that is so favorable to
capital market investing. Indeed, if certain structural reforms
are undertaken in a particular country, such as improvements
in the laws protecting small shareholders (e.g., lowering rate of
taxation of capital gains), the normative foundation of the
country may prove as propitious for such investing as the Unit-
ed States. In Japan or Italy, for example (or really in any de-
veloped country other than the United States),77 there may
exist a greater commitment to saving and stewardship of as-
sets for later generations and thus less tendency to consume
current assets and income. This social emphasis upon saving
may make up for, or even outweigh, the lack of a tradition in,
or hostility to, capital market investing, provided that individ-
uals learn to invest in the capital markets.78 Again, the cen-
tral challenge for investor education will be to make use of
existing norms so as to promote optimal saving and investing.
III. CONVERGENCE IN INVESTOR EDUCATION
An issue that surfaces in any comparative discussion of
contemporary business behavior or financial services is conver-
gence.79 In investor education, the question is simply whether
- See ANTOINE PROST, HISTOIRE DE L'ENSEIGNEMENT EN FRANCE 1800-1967 338
(1968) (citing remark of a minister in the Second Empire, as repeated by
Hippolyte Taine).
77 See GROUP OF TEN, supra note 1, at 28 (presenting statistics on savings
rates in major OECD countries); BERNHEIM, supra note 60, at 8 (same).
71 Indeed, saving is not a problem in Japan, but productive investment of the
saving is. See Jacob M. Schlesinger & David P. Hamilton, Thrift Shift: The More
the Japanese Save for a Rainy Day, The Gloomier It Gets, WALL ST. J., July 21,
1998, at Al.
" See Shleifer & Vishny, supra note 43.
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one form of education is "better" than any other and, as a poli-
cy matter, should be advocated in all developed countries.
Convergence, however, is a sensitive topic in policy circles. If,
on the one hand, one asserts that convergence is likely, the
assertion can be attributed to a U.S. cultural imperialism,
particularly on business or financial matters. If, on the other
hand, one suggests that there will be no convergence but the
persistence of cultural differences, the position can be seen as
a politically-motivated unwillingness to accept economic reali-
ty.80
Yet, convergence can be presented in a somewhat "neutral"
way. There are existing or imaginable forms of investor educa-
tion that have worked, or can work, in different cultures. The
central convergence question is whether one form is the most
suitable for present economic circumstances (which are the
same in many countries throughout the developed, and even
developing, world) because it produces the optimal saving and
investing behavior of ordinary people."' If this "ideal" investor
education can be identified, one should promote it as a policy
matter in most cultural settings. It may be difficult, however,
to eliminate politics, or at least economic and cultural power,
completely from this analysis. An aspect of a particular cul-
ture, like U.S. investor education, may be most suitable to
current economic circumstances because this culture has been
so instrumental in producing these circumstances in the first
place.
The corporate governance analogy exemplifies these points
about convergence. Convergence in corporate governance prac-
tices (if it exists) is arguably due to the decline of ownership
structures (especially government, family and financial institu-
tion ownership) that made other forms of corporate governance
possible.82 If and when these traditional owners disappear to
" In corporate governance debates, Judge Easterbrook and Professor Roe are
representative of these positions. See Easterbrook, supra note 28 (position support-
ive of convergence); Mark J. Roe, Chaos and Evolution in Law and Economics, 109
HARV. L. REv. 641, 643-44 (1996) (suggesting that certain behavior and practices
are "path dependent" or determined by historical and cultural circumstances).
" See Ronald J. Gilson, Corporate Governance and Economic Efficiency: When
Do Institutions Matter?, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 327, 335 (1996) (arguing that whether a
given system of corporate governance facilitates companies' adaptation to economic
circumstances is the critical issue).
82 But see LA PORTA ET AL., supra note 71, at 20-21 (observing that the U.S.
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be replaced by dispersed owners (albeit many of whom are in-
creasingly coordinated institutional owners such as pension
and mutual funds), corporate governance practices prevalent in
the United States, such as the emphasis on the board of direc-
tors and their duties, may be adopted because they are suit-
able for the new situation: they help the new kind of owner
monitor corporate agents.' Corporate governance convergence
would thus show a rational acceptance of a U.S. system that
was developed and works well for dispersed owners. A political
view of this phenomenon would add that, because U.S. institu-
tional investors are supplying much of the capital of non-U.S.
firms, they actively insist that these companies adopt corporate
governance practices with which they are familiar."
In corporate governance, therefore, a combination of inter-
related foreign and domestic forces may be removing tradition-
al corporate governance in many countries and replacing it
with something that looks like the U.S. system." In the pen-
sion area, similar pressures undermine state-provided pensions
and lead to individually-funded pensions. The question is sim-
ply whether, as is the case with corporate governance, other
cultures will adopt U.S. investor education practices because
the latter are the best suited for current economic circumstanc-
es. Despite the country and cultural differences in investor
education, will non-U.S. policymakers increasingly look to the
U.S. model of investor education if they adopt the individual
saving and investing decision-making in pensions that has
become so prevalent here?
corporate governance system of dispersed ownership is relatively uncommon
throughout the world).
' There are numerous examples of worldwide interest in, and acceptance of,
U.S. corporate governance practices. See, e.g., BUSINESS SECTOR ADVISORY GROUP
ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: IMPROVING COMPETrrIVE-
NESS AND ACCESS TO CAPITAL IN GLOBAL MARKETS: A REPORT To THE OECD
(1998) (recommending many corporate practices that are common in the United
States).
"8 See, e.g., James A. Fanto, The Transformation of French Corporate Gover-
nance and United States Institutional Investors, 21 BROOK. J. INTL L. 1, 18-28
(1995) (describing activism of U.S. institutional investors abroad).
' See James A. Fanto, 1998 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 97 (1997) (discussing such
factors as the need for inexpensive financing by world-class companies, the pres-
sure to reduce large government deficits, etc.).
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In the short term, there will likely be no worldwide con-
vergence toward U.S. investor education because of cultural
dissimilarities. However, another, specifically U.S., reason
exists. Despite the explosion of investor education products and
services in the United States, investor education here is a
recent phenomenon.86 It is thus premature to assume that
this education has a "classic" U.S. form similar in nature to the
U.S. corporate governance practices that have a long and com-
plex history and that have been in many cases codified in
law.87 Moreover, although there exist the common characteris-
tics of U.S. investor education discussed above, different educa-
tional approaches appear in the United States. For example,
general investing education presents the many investing possi-
bilities, while pension investing education helps investors to
decide among the restricted choices in a pension plan so as to
create an optimal portfolio. Forms of education (like different
corporate governance practices) can co-exist in one country;
indeed, one characteristic of U.S. investor education is its vari-
ety.
Non-U.S. policymakers seeking to develop individualized
pensions and capital markets may be justified in borrowing
features of U.S. investor education. In the United States, in-
vestor education outside the school environment has become a
commodity generally supplied by financial institutions or con-
sumer organizations. This has not produced adverse conse-
quences for ordinary people, because the educational product
and services are standardized (and an investor can use one or
the other and receive the same general training). Indeed, com-
petition in educational products and services among mutual
fund companies, banks and brokers (as well as nonprofit inves-
tor groups) has resulted in innovative educational formats that
"6 See Fanto, We're All Capitalists Now, supra note 8, at 142-45 (describing
these efforts).
"8 But see 29 U.S.C. §§ 1146-47 (1997) (codified version of the Savings Are
Vital to Everyone's Retirement Act of 1997, amending ERISA, among other things,
"to initiate the development of a broad-based, public education program to encour-
age and enhance individual commitment to a personal retirement savings strate-
gy.").
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help consumers understand the strengths of financial institu-
tions, the investments that these institutions offer and various
investing strategies (e.g., costs involved in investments).8
An active market in investor education promotes a
country's securities markets and ultimately enhances investor
well-being in a situation of self-directed pensions. The U.S.
market offers investors many investment products and services
that rarely belong-at least for any length of time-to a few fi-
nancial institutions, that offer both domestic and foreign in-
vestments and that often compete on cost. Such a selection of
products and investment approaches helps an investor better
design his or her portfolio. As a policy matter, therefore, it
makes sense for a country to encourage all its financial institu-
tions, as well as interested nonprofit groups, to provide inves-
tor education because it not only enhances competition among
these institutions in countries where this competition has often
been absent but also because it can lead to the provision of
educational products and services to ordinary people at low or
no cost.89 This approach to education could co-exist with a
country's "official" government-supervised or sponsored inves-
tor education, whether inside or outside the educational sys-
tem. In fact, market efforts can only benefit the official inves-
tor education, which can borrow the educational innovations
and expertise of market professionals, as happens in the Unit-
ed States." Indeed, if a country encourages competition in
investor education among all kinds of financial intermediaries,
the competition may better identify the optimal kind of educa-
tion for the country and its cultural setting. A lesson on inves-
tor education from the United States does not, therefore, have
to lead to more American dominance in world finance, may
reaffirm cultural diversity and, even more importantly, may
See Fanto, We're All Capitalists Now, supra note 8, at 144-45.
' See SHAH, supra note 44, at 34 (observing that, in general, all financial
intermediaries should be allowed to compete to provide pensions). Hemant Shah
rightly observes that such competition can have an important "bottom line" result:
it can improve returns to investors as intermediaries compete to offer the best re-
turn.
"o See supra note 65 (citing educational curriculum that is the product of a
collaboration between educational specialists and financial professionals working for
the National Association of Securities Dealers).
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efficiently create the saving and investing competence that is
so critical to the survival of everyone in a world of self-directed
pensions."'
CONCLUSION
Investor education is becoming important in developed and
even developing countries as, at this century's end, a shift from
government-sponsored and company-directed pensions to indi-
vidually funded and self-directed savings vehicles is underway.
The transformation, which will move at varying speeds in
different countries, is likely not to reverse itself, because demo-
graphics throughout the developed world is undermining the
traditional PAYG pension system as the ratio of retirees to
active workers significantly grows due to an increase in longev-
ity and a decrease in fertility. Governments no longer have the
freedom to provide generous pensions themselves or to man-
date that companies competing in worldwide markets do the
same for all their employees. The responsibility for retirement
planning is thus falling upon individuals and, because they
clearly need help to accomplish a task so critical to their future
survival, education provides one form of this aid.
This Article argues that the goal of investor education is
normative: it must convey to individuals basic, easily-applied
rules about saving and investing that allow them to save and
invest optimally, which also means enabling them to resist
some common behavioral problems associated with these activ-
ities. Because norms implicate the fundamental behavior in a
culture, investor education must generally build upon a
country's existing normative structure in order to be success-
ful. Investor education, therefore, will likely take different
forms in different counties because existing norms, including
norms related to education, vary across cultures and countries.
9 There is a pragmatic side to this argument. If, as is happening, U.S. finan-
cial institutions increasingly move throughout the world to offer their services in
other countries, particularly for self-directed pensions, they are likely to bring with
them their approaches to investor education. See, e.g., Anita Raghavan & Sara
Calian, Merrill's $5.3 Billion Overseas Bet: Mercury Deal Expands Reach, WALL ST.
J., Nov. 20, 1997, at C1 (describing Merrill Lynch's acquisition of Mercury Asset
Management and its plans to develop asset management outside the United
States).
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In short, investor education is likely to be culturally specific
and unlikely to follow a "one-size-fits-all" U.S. model. If some
convergence in educational products and approaches towards a
U.S. model occurs, it may happen in the marketplace for finan-
cial services where financial firms providing standardized
educational products or services in the United States expand
their markets outside this country (or lead to imitation by
foreign financial services firms). Such convergence is desirable
insofar as it offers ordinary people more investor education,
particularly through innovative technology, and may lead to
the best kind of education in a country. The services and prod-
ucts of firms, however, will in the short run supplement, not
replace, "official" forms of investor education (unless such
forms do not exist).
The goals of investor education are important and far-
reaching, more so outside the United States where in many
countries there is no recent history of market capitalism or
individual investing in securities. Not only will investor educa-
tion (together with other policies) help a country's citizens
obtain adequate retirement income, but it may enable the kind
of popular participation in securities markets without which
the capitalist system cannot be sustained. Even in developed
countries, if individuals do not acquire an everyday familiarity
with the basics of investing, capital market financing cannot
rest on a solid foundation. In a crisis, it may be swept away or
seriously curtailed, to be supplanted by other traditions of
economic direction that, in some cases, have only recently
receded.
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